History of Social Relations in India free essay sample

Caste and gender equations in Indian history No aspect of Indian history has excited more controversy than Indias history of social relations. Western indologists and Western-influenced Indian intellectuals have seized upon caste divisions, untouchability, religious obscurantism, and practices of dowry and sati as distinctive evidence of Indias perennial backwardness. For many Indologists, these social ills have literally come to define India and have become almost the exclusive focus of their writings on India. During the colonial period, it served the interests of the British (and their European cohorts) to exaggerate the democratic character of their own societies while diminishing any socially redeeming features of society in India (and other colonized nations). Social divisions and inequities were a convenient tool in the arsenal of the colonizers. On the one hand, tremendous tactical gains could be achieved by playing off one community against the other. On the other hand, there were also enormous psychological benefits in creating the impression that India was a land rife with uniquely abhorrent social practices that only an enlightened foreigner could attempt to reform. We will write a custom essay sample on History of Social Relations in India or any similar topic specifically for you Do Not WasteYour Time HIRE WRITER Only 13.90 / page Indias social ills were discussed with a contemptuous cynicism and often with a willful intent to instill a sense of deep shame and inferiority. Strong elements of such colonial imagery continue to dominate the landscape of Western Indology. A liberal, dynamic West embracing universal human values is posed against an obdurate and unchanging East clinging to odious social values and customs. It is little wonder, therefore, that Indias intellectuals have been unable to either fully understand the historic dynamics and context which gave life to these social practices or find effective solutions for their cure. Many historians and social activists appear to have tacitly accepted the notion that caste divisions in society are a uniquely Indian feature and that Indian society has been largely unchanged since the writing of the Manusmriti which provides formal sanction to such social inequities. But caste-like divisions are neither uniquely Indian nor has Indian society been as socially stagnant as commonly believed. In all non-egalitarian societies where wealth and political power were unequally distributed, some form of social inequity appeared and often meant hereditary privileges for the elite and legally (or socially) sanctioned discrimination against those considered lower down in the social hierarchy. In fact, caste-like divisions are to be found in the history of most nations whether in the American continent, or in Africa, Europe or elsewhere in Asia. In some societies, caste-like divisions were relatively simple, in others more complex. For instance, in Eastern Africa some agricultural societies were divided between land-owning and landless tribes (or clans) that eventually took on caste-like characteristics. Priests and warriors enjoyed special privileges in the 15th C. Aztec society of Mexico as did the Samurais (warrior nobles) and priests of medieval Japan. Notions of purity and defilement were also quite similar in Japanese society and members of society who carried out unclean tasks were treated as social outcasts just as in India. Amongst the most stratified of the ancient civilizations was the Roman Civilization where in addition to state-sanctioned slavery, there were all manner of caste-like inequities coded into law. Even in the Christian era, European feudalism provided all manner of hereditary privileges for the knights and landed barons (somewhat akin to Indias Rajputs and Thakurs) and amongst the royalty, arranged marriages and dowry were just as common as in India. Discrimination against the artisans was also commonplace throughout Europe, and as late as the 19th century artisans in Germany had to go through a separate court system to seek legal redress. They were not permitted to appeal to courts that dealt with the affairs of the nobility and the landed gentry. For instance, Beethoven wrote numerous letters to German judicial authorities pleading that he not be treated as a second-class citizen that as Germanys pre-eminent composer he deserved better treatment. ) A common pattern that seems to emerge from a study of several such ancient and medieval societies is that priests and warriors typically formed an elite class in most medieval societies and social privileges varied according to social rank; in settled agriculture based societies, this was usually closely related to ownership of land. For instance, we find no evidence of caste-like discrimination in societies where land was collectively owned and jointly cultivated, or where goods and services were exchanged within the village on the basis of barter, and there was no premium assigned to any particular type of work. All services and all forms of human labor were valued equally. Such village communes may have once existed throughout India and some appear to have survived until quite recently especially in the hills, (such as in parts of Himachal and the North East, including Assam and Tripura), but also in Orissa and parts of Central India. In such societies, we also see little evidence of gender discrimination. In India, caste and gender discrimination appear to become more pronounced with the advent of hereditary and authoritarian ruling dynasties, a powerful state bureaucracy, the growth of selective property rights, and the domination of Brahmins over the rural poor in agrahara villages. But this process was neither linear nor always irreversible. As old ruling dynasties were overthrown, previously existing caste equations and caste hierarchies were also challenged and modified. In many parts of India this process may have taken several centuries to crystallize and caste rigidity may be a much more recent phenomenon than has been commonly portrayed. The impression that caste divisions were always strictly enforced, or that there were no challenges to caste rigidity does not seem to square with a dispassionate examination of the Indian historical record. It should also be emphasized that caste-distinctions were not the only way, or even the most egregious way in which social inequities manifested themselves in older societies. In ancient Greece and Rome, the institution of slavery was at least as cruel a practice, if not worse. (It is therefore quite ironic how the slave-owning Greek states are revered by Western intellectuals as the worlds first democratic societies but ancient India is denigrated for its incomprehensible social ills. ) Levels and degree of caste discrimination in India have varied with time and there has been both upward and downward mobility of castes and social groups. Going by the strictures outlined in the Manusmriti, one might conclude that caste distinctions were set in stone, rigidly enforced and the possibilities of caste mobility completely circumscribed. But a closer examination of the historical record suggests otherwise. Already in the Upanishadic period there were tensions between Brahmins and Kshatriyas, and there are explicit parables in the Upanishadic texts illustrating how an enlightened Kshatriya was able to exceed a Brahmin in spiritual wisdom and philosophical knowledge. In the Mahabharatha, there are references to a Brahmin warrior suggesting that caste categories were not entirely inflexible. There is also criticism of parasitism amongst Brahmins in some of the texts from the Upanishadic period, and social commentators emphasized how those who reneged on their social obligations were undeserving of their caste privileges. This is an important point because it suggests that there was an implied social contract that involved both privileges and social obligations. The monarch might have enjoyed immense power and prestige, and exacted numerous rights over the common people, but also had the obligation to defend the people to protect them from invaders, to dispense justice in an unprejudiced manner and assist in the development and preservation of irrigation facilities and roads. Failure to meet such expectations could and did lead to revolts, and dynasties rose and fell within a matter of few generations. Challenges to Brahminical hegemony and caste-rigidity In the Upanishads, there is also recognition that conceptions of god could be quite varied, that Brahminical rituals were not essential to spiritual release, and that individuals might choose different deities or methods of worship. This ecumenical outlook facilitated the growth of alternative viewpoints not only in the realm of religious practice but also on norms of how society ought to be structured. Social challenges to absolute monarchical rule and the immense power of the priestly class probably led to a crescendo during the Buddhist period when Brahmin hegemony received challenges from several quarters from radical atheists such as the Lokayatas, from Jain agnostics, and heterodox Hindus and Buddhists who wanted to reconstruct society on a less discriminatory and more humane basis. Although it would be wrong to romanticize the Buddhists as being completely against caste distinctions {since there is evidence that they accepted caste distinctions in society outside their sanghas (communes)}, Buddhists along with other social critics undoubtedly played a powerful role in ensuring that caste was not the sole or even the dominant factor in shaping Indian society of that period. This is borne out by how so many ruling clans arose from a non-Kshatriya (and also non-Brahmin) background. The Nandas, the Mauryas, the Kalingas and the Guptas are just some of the more illustrious of Indias ruling dynasties that did not arise from a Kshatriya background. (Of course, once some of these clans established themselves as ruling dynasties, they took on the Kshatriya mantle, and over time, the radical changes that accompanied their ascent to power gave way to social conservatism and a decaying of the radical currents that had contributed to their rise to power). It is also worth noting that the classical four varna division of Hindu society (as described in the Manusmriti) does not appear to have had much practical significance if one were to go by the accounts of the Greek chronicler, Megasthenes. In his accounts of Mauryan India. Megasthenes appears to list a seven fold social order in which he differentiates between the priest and the philosopher (who he ranked much above the priest, and who could have been a Brahmin, Jain or Buddhist) and also gives special attention to court bureaucrats such as record keepers, tax collectors and judicial officials. He also ascribed to the peasantry a higher status than might be inferred from the Manusmriti and noted with amazement how the peasantry was left unharmed during battles. According to Megasthenes, philosophers whether Brahmins or Jain/Buddhist monks also had obligations in terms of offering advice to the ruler in matters of public policy, agriculture, health and culture. Repeated failure to provide sound counsel could lead to a loss of privileges even exile or death. Thus, although many Brahmins may have held on to their privileges by being shameless sycophants others made significant contributions in the realm of science, philosophy and culture. Social mobility was possible since learning was not an exclusive preserve of the Brahmins and both the Buddhist and Jain sanghas admitted people from different social backgrounds and also admitted women. (Jyotsna Kamat points to a Karnataka inscription from 1187 A. D. hat suggests that Jain nuns enjoyed the same amount of freedom as their male counterparts. ) The more advanced sanghas enforced a separate quorum for women to ensure that a largely male gathering may not take decisions that did not meet with the approval of the women members of the sangha. Over time, it appears that the sanghas degenerated, losing their intellectual vitality and egalitarian spirit allowing the Brahmins to gradually consolidate their power and influence in the Gangetic plain. But even as late as the 6th-7th C, Gupta-period inscriptions describing land grants in Bengal appear to corroborate Megasthenes view of how Indian society was structured. Social rank of senior court administrators (who may have risen from different caste backgrounds) invariably exceeded the rank of ordinary village priests. (In Orissa, Rajasthan and parts of Central and Southern India, this pattern prevailed till even later. Moreover, as society headed towards aste-ossification, it was the court administrators who after acquiring hereditary caste status, became the most privileged agents in society. In some instances, these administrative castes simply merged with other privileged castes such as Brahmin or Kshatriya, or else they were treated as equivalent, and the historic distinctions between then became blurred or obscured. ) In a sampling of Gupta period land grant decrees, it is intriguing that caste identities are omitted more often than explicitly included. Had caste been as i mportant or dominant a social category, one might expect otherwise. Some of the most important figures appear to be officials involved in tax collection and land measurement. Various ranks of officials are mentioned without any explicit mention of their caste. Villagers are also frequently named without reference to their cast. Only occasionally, there are references to villagers who are also mentioned as being Brahmins. Some of the land grant records indicate that before land grants were made, certain categories of villagers perhaps those considered more important were consulted by the higher officials. Although Brahmins are mentioned in the list of those consulted, there are equal references to other categories of villagers such as kutumbins and mahattaras who may have been village officials or important landholders in the village. {Vishwa Mohan Jha (see ref. below) describes the kutumbins and mahattaras as varna/jati nuetral categories (i. e. caste-independent categories) that included Brahmins and non-Brahmins alike. } Other references point to consultative committees that included the chief artisan, the chief scribe, the merchant and the guild-president of the town. It also appears that administrative changes led to the creation of new posts, the merger or elimination of older posts, and changes in ranks of various officials over time. An examination of the land grant decrees over a space of three centuries (5th-7th C Bengal) points to such changes and others such as changes in procedures, or changes in the constitution of consultative committees, perhaps to reflect changing political alliances or changes in the economic status of different groups of townspeople and villagers. In a land allotment plate from Paschimbagh (Bengal) Brahmins are mentioned as tax payers, and the status of ordinary Brahmins does not seem at all exceptional. For instance, it points to a teacher or a Vedic scholar as being entitled to 10 patakas of land, but other Brahmins were entitled to only 2 patakas a share less than that of a Kayastha (record-keeper) or Vaidya (medical practitioner). Carpenters, smiths and artisans were also put far above other service communities in terms of their share of land. The Paschimbagh inscription also describes the grant of plots of land to florists, potters, carpenters, masons, blacksmiths and sweepers for serving a matha (monastery) indicating that when land was granted for a temple or monastery, priests were not the exclusive beneficiaries of land grants. (Two Bhaumakara charters from Talcher/Dhenkanal in Orissa similiarly refer to donations of land for a Buddhist temple, and allocations for its maintenance. ) A study of land grants from 12th C Rajasthan (Pali) and Karnataka (Kalikatti) suggests that land grants had a limited life tenure even when initially decreed to be for life or for perpetuity. Beneficiaries of land grants were subject to transfers, and grants to a particular beneficiary were transferred to another beneficiary five or ten years later. It also appears that the beneficiaries were selected based on administrative rank rather than any particular caste-affiliation. It is also not at all apparent that administrative rank was limited by birth. In Orissa, there is explicit evidence to the contrary. Ordinary peasants were able to rise up in the ranks of the military, and it is likely that a similar situation prevailed in the administrative ranks. Mayadhar Mansinha (see ref. below) suggests that a combination of factors such as training, merit and personal determination played a role, (in addition to social standing and political connections) in determining rank and promotions. In Karnataka, there is evidence that some of the chief administrators were women. (See Jyotsna Kamat, ref. provided below) Brahminical Ascendance Nevertheless, the seeds for a more privileged role for the Brahmins were also being sown through the process of land grants to Brahmins. In some instances, thousands of Brahmins were granted rights to hitherto uncultivated land. In other cases, Brahmins were appointed as the local representatives of the state authorities in what are described as agrahara villages where Brahmins presided over small peasants, who in Bihar were mostly landless sharecoppers or bonded labourers. These agrahara villages were typically small villages and sattelites of bigger villages that included members of several castes and bigger land-holders. In Bihar, such agrahara villages proliferated and it is quite likely that in such agraharas oppressive social relations and some of the most egregious patterns of caste-centred discrimination and exploitation may have developed. (While early Gupta period records indicate the existence of rural consultative councils that mediated between the rulers and the artisans and peasants, it seems that such consultative councils became less important or were phased out with the growth of the agraharas. Thereafter, the Brahmins became the sole intermediaries between the village and the state, and over time, this may have enabled the Brahmins to exercise social and political hegemony over other inhabitants of the village. It also appears that the greatest incidence of the practice of untouchability occurs in conjunction with the growth in the power and authority of the Brahmins in such villages. ) But these developments took time to spread elsewhere in India, first spreading to Bengal and eastern UP, and very gradually elsewhere in India. However, this pattern was not necessarily replicated in identical form throughout India and some parts of India virtually escaped this trend. In agrahara villages in other parts of India, Brahmins did take on the role of local administrators and tax collectors, but the status of the small peasantry was not always as miserable as in Bihar. The degree of exploitation and oppression appears to be related to the extent of alienation from land-ownership. For example, evidence for Brahmin domination in Kalikatti, Southern Karnataka emerges after the 13th C. hen villagers were instructed to pay taxes to the Brahmin assignees, leading to constant tensions and disputes, but without dramatic changes in the overall status of the tax-paying villagers. Although Brahminization was an important factor in leading to caste ossification, it was not necessarily the sole or even the most important factor in the mix. The impact of the Islamic invasions, colonization by the British and ecological changes played an equally crucial if not decisive role in many instances. For instance, in Orissa, the ossification of the bureaucracy and its conversion into a group of privileged and exclusive castes appears to take place after the 14th-15th C. when we begin to see a general decline in its overseas trade due to the silting up of its rivers. At the same time, we see the growth of Brahminical hegemony in the realm of religion and military defeats at the hands of the Mughal armies led by Raja Man Singh of Jaipur. All these factors may have played a role in destroying the vibrancy of Oriya society and encouraging caste conservatism. See the essay on the History of Orissa for more on this subject. ) Impact of the Islamic Invasions Unfortunately, many social historians have studiously ignored the effect of such external factors in the shaping of social relations in India. But we know that the Islamic invasions led to monumental changes in the political and cultural life of the sub-continent and especially so in the Gangetic plain so it would be exceedingly od d if the invasions had no impact on the social structure of Indian society. While some social analysts have tried to analyze Hindu society during the period of Islamic rule as though it had been untouched by the Islamic invasions and left to stagnate in a cocoon of its own making, others have succumbed to illusory simplifications such as Islam was an egalitarian faith whereas Hinduism had caste divisions. Because Islam first arose in those parts of the world where settled agriculture was not possible i. e. in the desert sands of the Arabian peninsula social divisions had not yet emerged in quite the same way that they had in long settled agricultural societies like India. For the warring nomadic tribes of the desert, Islam may have been a tool for the upward mobility of clans that may have earlier survived on petty thievery and by raiding the wealth of settled urban societies (and later for those who joined the ranks of the military in the Islalmic states), the upward mobility of some came at the expense of enormous human rights violations against others. In the hands of expansionist conquerors, Islam became more an instrument of devastation and terror rather than a vehicle for social equality or social justice. Taken in its entirety, the period of Islamic rule in India cannot be seen as furthering social equity or social harmony in the subcontinent. As a faith-based ideological system Islam could at best guarantee equality before God i. e. equality after death. However, a closer study of the Quran dispels even such notions, for even amongst believers, there is gender discrimination and rank based on the quality and type of service provided to the Islamic cause. In any case, on earth, the plight of Muslim converts depended more on social realities, on political equations than on the abstract and remote promise of equality offered by Islam. During times of heavy political and economic oppression, the only option for the poor was complete and total submission to the will of God which in effect meant sacrificing all their autonomy in favor of the clergy, (who rarely challenged political authority), and more often than not, were largely beholden to the rulers who chose to support and promote them. When the clergy did resist political authority, it often tended towards social conservatism and reaction rather than social progress. By and large, social inequities widened with the onset of Islamic rule in the sub-continent. Land revenue records clearly indicate that with few exceptions (as in Kashmir and Bengal for a time), Islamic rulers taxed the peasantry at significantly higher rates. If the average rate of taxation during the pre-Islamic period varied between 10% to a maximum of 20% averaging around 15-16%, it had increased to 33% or even more under the Mughals. Note that even the Manusmriti limited the tax rate on the peasantry to one-sixth about 16%) While all Islamic rulers may not have insisted on the discriminating jaziya, many of the earlier invaders insisted upon it, and more than one court chronicler of the Delhi Sultanate describes the violent means taken to suppress peasant rebellions and extract the high taxes from the crushed peasantry. Urban revolts were also n ot uncommon and the Arab chronicler Ibn Batuta mentions how such rebellions were suppressed with great cruelty. Punishment for those who rebelled could mean loss of adults (particularly young women) and children to slavery, massacres or forced evacuations of entire villages and small towns, pillage and destruction of places of learning, of temples and other symbols of cultural identification, and denial of job opportunities in the courts. In the early centuries of Islamic rule, the distrust of the locals was so intense that virtually all the important administrative positions were kept in the hands of foreigners. Romila Thapar has pointed out that prior to the Islamic invasions, Hindu rulers also invaded or pillaged the temples of their rivals, especially since these temples were repositories of great wealth. She has also indicated that the management of some of these rich temples was extremely corrupt. Plunder of temple wealth was definitely a factor in the destruction of such temples during raids and attacks by Islamic invaders and conquerors. However, during the Islamic invasions, this prac tice accelerated both in frequency and intensity. It should also be noted that not all temples were storehouses of great wealth or under the management of corrupt Brahminical trusts. The majority of temples had considerable cultural significance for the local populations and many were built and maintained by non-Brahminical cults. For instance, in Bundelkhand, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa, there are a sizable number of surviving temples that not only escaped the path of the Islamic invaders, but were obviously left untouched in local battles between rival Hindu kings. There are even scattered remains from the Gupta period. But in the Gangetic plain, virtually nothing from the regions pre-Islamic past has survived. Clearly, there were important political dimensions to the destruction of Northern Indias cultural wealth. One might speculate that the political subjugation of a reluctant and possibly even hostile population required the physical elimination of cultural symbols that instilled pride and self-confidence, and thus threatened the authority of the alien rulers. In any case, the smashing of facial features, genitalia and breasts on sculpted figures has no parallel to earlier practices. There is also little evidence that those defeated in battle were killed or enslaved on the scale of what happened during the Islamic invasions. ) For instance, the Afghanistan region (which once had a sizeable Hindu and Buddhist population) acquired the reputation of being a land where Hindus were slaughtered and hence took the name Hindu-Kush, and references to wanton destruction occur with boastful regularity in the records of the triumphant conquerors. However, in the Gangetic plain the Hindu population was essential in maintaining the tax base for the rulers and therefore, it was only necessary to break the autonomy of the Hindu population and crush their resistance to higher taxation. This was largely achieved through the almost complete destruction of older centres of culture and learning, burning of libraries such as in Nalanda and Vikramshila, the widespread conversion of Buddhists to Islam, and violent acts of reprisal against those who resisted. One of the most deleterious effects of the Islamic invasions on social relations in India was the practice of slavery, which was introduced on a scale hitherto unseen in the subcontinent. Unlike the societies of the East, slavery appears to have played an important role almost throughout the history of the Western world and the Quran has passages that endorse the practice of slavery. During the Islamic period, in sub-Saharan Africa, slaves labored in the salt mines and copper mines and served as a vital link in the trans-Saharan trade routes acting as porters where camels and donkeys could not go. Scott Levi (Univ. of Wisconsin) points to judicial documents of medieval Samarqand (and other Central Asian sources) that disclose the presence there of many thousands of Indian slaves throughout the medieval period. A number of Indian sources make it clear that, from the early Ghaznavid raids to the Mughal period, hundreds of thousands (if not millions over the centuries) of men, women and children were marched over to the slave markets in Iran and Central Asia, i. e. beyond the northwest frontier of India, and out of the reach of their familial support systems. Although state sanctioned slavery came to an end with the dawn of the Christian era in Europe, a slave-owning replica of ancient Rome arose in the American South, and slaves were employed throughout the Caribbean and South America. The Portuguese were notorious for their slave-markets in India. Even as slavery was banned in Europe, the European trading companies made huge profits from the slave trade. Slavery was not a pract ice confined to the Islamic parts of the world. ) The practice of slavery probably led to the growth in the custom of Jauhar and Sati amongst the military castes. Prior to the Islamic invasions, there are very few records to indicate that such practices were widely followed. But the onslaught of the Islamic invaders had led to a complete breakdown in the implementation of war ethics. Whereas in earlier wars, it was required of both sides to protect the peasantry, to leave women, children and the elderly at peace, and there were injunctions against the enslavement of prisoners or of harming those who surrendered in battle the invaders had few if any compunctions in unleashing all manner of torments on the defeated population. In such an environment, it is not surprising that for the proud Rajput societies, the act of jauhar, or mass suicide was a more honorable option. (It should be noted that such acts of mass or individual suicide are not unknown elsewhere in the world. Sometimes these acts were voluntary (as was usually emphasized in the Indian tradition), at other times they were entirely coerced. Amongst the Vikings, it was customary for a warriors young concubines to join the funeral pyres of dead Viking warriors. In ancient Nubia (upper Sudan and lower Egypt) there are records of mass suicide upon the death of a warrior king and Nubian burials of warriors indicate practices quite similiar to Jauhar / Sati . There are also parallels in the Japanese tradition of Harakiri'(suicide for honour) or Sepukku amongst the Samurai warrior nobles of Japan. Voluntary suicide of widows (although rare) also took place in China during the reign of the Qing dynasty. There are also records of the Celts and the Romans practicing human sacrifice. Amongst the Aztecs of the 15th C, the custom of human sacrifice of the defeated does not appear to have any voluntary character, and was seen as a legitimate rite in the celebration of a victory in war. Western feminist indologists who see the practice of Sati as a unique form of gender oppression peculiar to India might note that in the Christian world, the scourge of witch-burning was a far more dangerous threat to the lives of women. The mere charge of being a witch could lead to public hanging, and the Salem-witch trials in America were part of a long chain of witch-burnings that took place throughout Christian Europe and carried over into New England) Nevertheless, Islamic rule in India did not prevail entirely without benefits for specific social classes who chose to collaborate with the invaders. Trading communities probably benefited from the installation of Islamic rulers whose policies of lower taxes on trade, and state support of local traders and financiers was in their interest. Scott Levi suggests that from the end of the thirteenth century, and throughout much of the Delhi Sultanate period, the Muslim nobility were dependent upon heavily capitalized indigenous banking firms (identified in the Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi as Sahs and Multanis). These domestic financiers loaned seeds and other necessary inputs to peasants and village-artisans and manufacturers (such as textile weavers) in return for a share of the produce. The rest they bought in cash, and a part of that cash was then recovered by the state treasuries through taxation. It should also be noted that, (by and large), Islamic rulers born and raised in India relied less on violence and sheer terror, but sought alliances with sections of the local population, especially with those amongst the Hindu elite who were willing to collaborate. Although some of these alliances were coerced, others led to tangible material benefits for the royal collaborators. Alliances were forged through marriage, or simply from political convenience. Military alliances with Hindu rulers were crucial in maintaining the power of many Islamic rulers. After Akbar, the Mughals relied heavily on the Jaipur and Bikaner Rajputs, who in return were given rights to a share of the taxes extracted from the Gangetic plain. And although Hindus were numerically discriminated in jobs at the courts, by skillfully playing off different caste communities against one another, the Mughals were able to win over a section of the Hindus in maintaining their position of political preeminence. Hence, it would be wrong to see the many centuries of Islamic rule in India purely from the prism of religious antagonisms. But it would be equally wrong to see the long period of rule by Islamic-identified rulers (even those that were born in India) as entirely benevolent or benign, or no different from the rule of earlier Hindu kings. Since most were heavier taxers, the distance between the ruling elites and the peasant and artisan masses tended to widen and there were other aspects of Islamic rule (particularly during the rule of the more oppressive Sultanates) that limited social mobility. For many of the Islamic rulers, the Brahmin dominated agraharas were highly suited to efficient tax collection and the might of the Sultanates came down very heavily on social challenges that weakened the ability of the state to collect taxes. The fear of enslavement and the denial of equal access to job opportunities in the Sultanate courts led to Hindu society becoming extremely inward-looking in large parts of the plains. With opportunities or jobs in the administrative ranks shrinking, caste loyalties were in all likelihood strengthened, not weakened. Thus, rather than shake up the caste system as some might expect, Islamic rule (by foreign invaders who distrusted the locals) may have actually helped in its crystallization. Neither is there any evidence that Islamic rule helped end the practice of untouchability. (In fact, the problems of untouchability and caste-discrimination are especially notable in states like UP and Bihar where Islamic rule held complete sway for five centu ries. In Sindh and Western Punjab, where almost the entire population was converted to Islam, it is important to observe that janitorial workers were never converted, and to this date remain a highly oppressed and discriminated group. There is also evidence that Muslims developed their own versions of caste. Romila Thapar points out how foreign-origin Muslims such as Syeds, Sheiks and Ashrafs kept themselves consciously apart from Muslims who came from artisan and peasant backgrounds. Language was another divider. In Bijapur district, the elite Muslims spoke Urdu whereas the ordinary Muslims spoke Kannada. Zarina Bhatty in an essay on Social stratification among Muslims describes caste differentiation amongst Ashraf and non-Ashraf Muslims and notions of impurity that closely parallel caste cleavages and attitudes in Hindu society. Sandra Mackey in the Caste/Class System in Iran describes patterns of social differentiation remarkably similiar to Indias. Also see note below) Over time, Islamic rule in India created a much stronger and more unified elite, which made it more difficult for the ordinary masses to resist regressive social changes, particularly in the realm of philosophical choice, religious pluralism, regional and local autonomy in matters of religion, gender equity, freedom of sexual expression and sexual orientation. For instance, prior to the arrival of Islam, women enjoyed greater freedom of movement and dress. 1th C chronicler of Indian life, Al-Biruni expresses puzzlement at how the Hindu men (of Punjab) took the advice of the women in all consultations and emergencies. But in a matter of few centuries, Islamic notions of gender separation and sexual prudery had infected Hindu households as well. A weaker version of the Purdah system and a more conservative dress code became the custom even in Hindu homes, especially so amongst those of the trading community that had frequent contacts with Muslims. Although in sime passages, the Quran states that their ought to be no compulsion in matters of religion, in other passages, the Quran leaves no doubt that force and coercion are acceptable in furthering Islamic practice. Consequently, the practice of Islam conformed more to the passages advicating force and coercion. In Mali, the Tunisian chronicler Ibn Batuta noted that children who were neglectful in learning the Quran were put in chains until they had it memorized. Regarding India, he commented how newly converted peasants had a very lackadaisical attitude towards attending regular prayers and how the Imams had to cane non-attendees to force attendance. He also describes how he personally led a battle against the reluctance of women to cover their breasts in the Maldives. In the Indian tradition, moral codes concerning dress were more in keeping with the natural environment. Clothes were light and simple, consistent with the generally hot climate. And in matters of religion, there was greater diversity, and much more personal choice. It was often up to the devotee to visit a temple at a time of his or her choosing. Which deity to worship involved an element of local choice and different jatis might worship different deities. Local versions of the epics such as the Ramayana and the Krishna-Leela were popularized and recent research points to hundreds of different versions in circulation. Unlike in Islam, pilgrimages were undertaken under less pressure and with greater individual volition. Al-Biruni also noted how the Hindus were remarkably flexible and willing to change customs and traditions they no longer felt to be relevant or essential.

Help Society Essay

Help Society Essay Help: Society Essay Homelessness in America The homeless face many challenges. They become sick and cant be cared for. They can’t afford food, so they have to starve. The homeless freeze in the winter because they aren't able to pay for coats and clothes for cold weather. People throw things at them such as trash, and treat them like garbage. When kids are homeless their grades start to drop, and they also get stressed out. Our society helps the homeless out to straighten up the problems they face. Our society has homeless shelters so homeless people are able to have a bed to sleep in, and also have food to eat. We also help the homeless with a â€Å"DARE to CARE Program†. Our society has places where people donate clothes and food for homeless or people who can’t afford it. â€Å"Salvation Army† donates food, clothes, blankets, and things that poor people cant buy because of financial problems. Many people in the society help find affordable houses for homeless to stay. To help the homeless, we could do many things that we don't do. We could provide more programs since there are 243,627 homeless people in the U.S. I know not all these living homeless people can’t stay at a couple of shelters. The shelters give the homeless expired foods and none of the people want to eat that because they know they will get sick. So why don't we give the homeless shelters that have food that isn't expired, and that lets them sleep in separate rooms. We could also create a business that lets homeless people work